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In recent years, amphetamine type substances (ATS) have become the most widely used illegal 
narcotic drugs in Mainland Southeast Asia.  These substances contain the medicinal alkaloid
 ephedrine which is amply found in Asiatic species of the Ephedra Family.  Ephedra is known in 
Chinese as ma huang (麻黄), “Yellow Cannabis.”  The plants themselves are mostly deciduous 
shrubs growing in arid areas in the middle and north of China and points westward.
As Bertil Lintner and Michael Black show clearly in Merchants of Madness, production and 
use of ATS in the region has exploded in recent years, far surpassing the total number of opiate 
users.  Because ATS in this region is essentially a local phenomena with little exported to Europe 
or North America, much less is known about it outside Southeast Asia.
However, within Thailand and Burma as well as its neighbors, ATS has become a serious 
problem.  As long ago as 1996, UNDCP officials (the United Nations International Drug Control 
Programme, forerunner of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC) were becom-
ing aware that ATS production in the region was accelerating even as opium poppy cultivation and 
use was stagnating if not actually declining.  In its 2010 Situation Assessment on Amphetamine-Type 
Stimulants (UNODC Global SMART Programme 2010), UNODC noted that 50–80 percent of the
world’s ATS users are in East and Southeast Asia, that almost 100 million tablets were seized in 
2009, and that production is increasing mostly in border areas in North and East Shan State.
As with opium, ephedrine has both positive and negative properties.  It stimulates the brain, 
increases the heart rate, and expands the bronchial tubes.  It also increases the metabolism.
 Ephedrine has long been used in China to treat asthma and other ailments.  In the United States 
ephedrine is the active ingredient in pharmaceutical preparations such as Benzedrine which was 
an inhalant for the treatment of asthma.  However, when it was learned that ephedrine had a 
euphoric effect, people began removing the paper strip inside the inhaler and swallowed it. 
 “Bennies” grew so popular that Ian Fleming had 007 using them in three of his novels.  There are 
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websites that claim that ephedra “is a plant with a PR problem,” has a reputation as a “troublesome” 
herb, and can contribute to weight loss and other benefits (i.e. http://www.diagnose-me.com/treat/
T327930.html).
The Asiatic ephedra plants are not native to the countries of Southeast Asia but to Mongolia 
and the north of China, where the substance was formerly known as ma huang.  In Thailand it was 
called ya ma.  Probably ma originally was derived from the Chinese ma huang but when used in 
Thai it came to be pronounced with the same tone as ma, meaning horse.  As Lintner and Black 
well explain, this horse medicine became widely known after World War II among long distance 
truckers as useful for staying awake on long drives with an estimated 300,000 users in Thailand.
As for negative side-effects, Lintner and Black, as well as the Thai Government, UNODC, and 
other involved agencies point out that the drug can cause aggressive behavior leading to murder, 
kidnappings, and other violent crime.  Unlike opiates which generally sedate the user, ATS can 
lead to conflicts and much harm to innocent bystanders.
Ya ma remained something of a niche drug for decades until the 1990s when groups in the 
northeast of Burma, such as the United Wa State Army and other breakaway groups from the 
Communist Party of Burma, began producing large quantities of ATS.
It was at this time, and through a marketing process not fully understood (but discussed in 
depth by Chouvy and Meissonnier [2004, 81–103]), ATS use spread rapidly and particularly among
school children—mostly boys in their second year of secondary school (grade 8 in the 12 year Thai 
pre-university educational system).  At that time, teachers throughout the country remember 
seeing pieces of foil from cigarette packs scattered around the more remote areas of secondary 
school campuses as the sign of a problem they did not understand.  The students were “smoking 
the dragon” with ATS pills, that is grinding the pills up and burning the powder on the foils which 
they then inhaled.
Subsequent studies revealed that these young students, beginning to grow confident in sec-
ondary school and as very young adults associated ya ma with having more fun in group activities. 
The very name, ya ma (horse medicine) which associated the pills with strength and medicine, 
made them all the more appealing.  By 1996, the number of users had increased to over one million
(Chayan 1996, 102) and had become the most abused substance in the country.
In that year, the Thai Government decided to change the name from ya ma to ya ba, i.e. crazy 
or madness medicine in order to reduce the allure of the name to would-be users.  From then on 
the Thai Government would carry out a heightened campaign against the production, trafficking, 
and use of ATS that peaked in Prime Minister Thaksin’s War on Drugs in 2003.  Although that 
lapsed and he is no longer in power, the country has continued efforts to reduce the use of the drug 
that is now by far the most widely used narcotic substance in the country.
Lintner and Black focus attention on the merchants who sell the drug, especially at the begin-
ning of the marketing chain.  Their study starts with the 1989 mutiny by which three groups in 
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northeastern Shan State, broke with the Communist Party of Burma to take control of their respec-
tive regions.  The first is Kokang, whose rulers are descended from refugees loyal to the Ming 
Dynasty in China in the 1600s.  Besides Kokangese, there are also Palaung and other groups.
Second are the Wa, actually, a diverse group of peoples speaking sometimes mutually unintelli-
gible dialects.  They were united politically during the CPB era during which time the area under 
Wa authority expanded southwards from Pang Kham1) to Mong Pawk, Hotao, and Mong Phen where
the people are mostly Lahu and Akha.  The third group is based in Mong La and comprises three 
main groups, Tai Lu (often locally called Shan), Akha, and Tai Loi, a Mon-Khmer speaking group 
also known as Bulang.  Following the collapse of the CPB, these three areas were given autonomy 
(in the case of the Wa, considerable) over their areas, known to the government as Kokang Special 
Region 1, Wa Special Region 2, and Special Region 4 (based in Mong La).
On page 66, there are photos of 16 individuals identified as the main “players.”  Almost all of 
them are connected with the Wa Region either as leaders, such as Bao Youxiang, or as financiers, 
such as Wei Xuegang.  The remainder are Chinese or Shan associated with Shan rebel groups, 
such as Yawt Serk.
Lintner and Black devote most of the book to the background of these individuals and their 
organizations who they indicate are those most responsible for the recent spread of ATS.  They 
explain how ATS production came to be prominent and how use spread to Thailand.  They do not 
discuss the merchants on the Thai side except for a few who were arrested.  They add that the 
Thai police know who they are but are constrained from taking action due to corruption and pro-
tection afforded the big bosses.  They paint a picture of organized crime, human rights abuse,
smuggling, and money laundering.
They describe the financial empires created by the ATS merchants such as in a massive casino
complex being built at the Boten border crossing between Luang Namtha in Laos and Mong La 
across the border in Yunnan.  They detail how the Hong Pang Company, a conglomerate involved 
in gems and jewelry, construction, and agriculture grew.  The authors contend that these and other
concerns have grown immensely wealthy from ATS production and sales that they are growing 
indiscriminately in wealth and influence.
The authors blame the confused politics and ethnic conflicts in Burma for the explosion of 
ATS production.  They chide “global hypocrisy” by which the “West likes to posture itself as a 
champion in the ‘war on drugs’” but in fact is implicated for having pushed opium into China and 
elsewhere in the nineteenth century.  There are “no angels or devils in the Golden Triangle; they 
are often one and the same” (pp. 143–144).
However, demonizing the Wa they say is counterproductive because it will not lead to any 
1) Lintner and Black refer to this city as Panghsang, but the Wa no longer use this term which they
claim is inauspicious.
Book Reviews 207
solution of the amphetamine trade (p. 144).  “Engaging them may be the only way forward.”  They 
lament that “the world insisted on working only through the UN and ‘recognized governments’” 
(p. 144) rather than taking the opportunity of acting on a proposal by a Wa leader named Saw Lu. 
He had written an open letter entitled “The Bondage of Opium: The Agony of the Wa People, a 
Proposal and a Plea” stating that the Wa wanted to end opium poppy cultivation in exchange for 
certain political concessions including a “separate state for the Was within a federal union” (p. 108). 
However, no action was taken according to the authors because “The DEA and the UN’s various 
agencies said they were not able to provide any direct assistance to the Was” and that aid would 
have to go through “the Burmese government” (p. 110).
While we can be sure that Saw Lu told this to one of the authors (p. 171), this was not the end
of the story to UN providing development assistance to the Wa.  Two years earlier, UNDCP 
Executive Director, Giorgio Giacomelli had finalized a drug control MOU between the six Mekong 
countries.  By late-1992, all six, including Myanmar, had signed an action plan that included law 
enforcement, demand reduction, and alternative development projects.  This plan was based both 
the region’s needs as well as the funding realities of UNDCP which require it to depend on contri-
butions for many activities from countries such as in Europe, Scandinavia, Australasia, and North 
America.  Since none were willing to fund law enforcement work in Myanmar (although some 
regional projects were supported in which Myanmar participated), work in Myanmar was in alter-
native development and drug treatment.  When Giacomelli went to Myanmar in May 1993, he 
visited Lashio, Kengtung, and Tachilek in Shan State where he discussed the small development 
projects that were soon started in Hopong, a government-controlled area with many Wa, Nam Tit 
which was in the Wa Region, and Silu District of Special Region 4.
It is likely that the government of Myanmar had already decided on this course of action 
prior to Saw Lu’s discussion with one of the authors.  How much the Wa were involved is unclear
but they were in agreement with the basic idea of the UNDCP project early on.  In 2006, while 
managing the UNODC Wa Project, I was told by a former UNDCP representative to Myanmar, 
that Wa leaders in about 1993 had asked UNDCP staff in Silu for help with their plan to stop
growing poppy which they had included in their first five-year development plan in 1990.  They 
(who were in agreement with Saw Lu on the advisability of banning opium) told UNDCP that
their effort to eliminate opium comprised three five-year development plans, culminating in a 
ban in 2005.
UNDCP referred the matter in 1993 to the government which initially objected to the idea. 
But after negotiations, Hotao was decided on by all as the best site because of its proximity to Silu 
and also Mong Yang which was under government control and it had road access both to Kengtung 
and an all-weather road to the China border seven miles to the east.
This led to the formulation of the UNDCP/UNODC Wa Project, that ran from 1998 to 2008 
and was designed to provide assistance, through community development, agricultural extension, 
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and drug treatment, to poppy farmers so as to ease their transition to new livelihoods following 
the opium ban in 2005.  The Wa, who had not fully been involved in the formulation process, 
however, were expecting grants of funds by which they could develop the region, beginning with 
infrastructure, in its own way.  After several years of negotiations, some run-ins, and trials and 
errors on all sides, a methodology acceptable to the Wa, the Government, and UNODC was 
reached.
This entailed providing high yield open pollinated rice to poppy growers, small-scale irrigation 
projects to provide water for newly-developed or expanded paddy fields, drug treatment, vocational 
training (i.e. carpentry, tailoring, livestock raising), and small infrastructure development such as 
for feeder roads.  The aim was to enable the farmers to grow more (if not always enough) rice on 
lowland fields which (in the absence of secure land title deeds) was the most certain way the farm-
ers could hold their land and protect it from sometimes avaricious Wa officials who otherwise would 
appropriate the land to grow rubber or tea.  By the end of 2007, the project had grown quite effec-
tive in providing this assistance, as shown in Table 1.
By this time the approach the project had taken had encouraged many other organizations to 
participate, all with the approval of the Wa Authority (and the Government).  These included UN 
agencies such as the World Food Programme, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA, as well as 
international NGOs including Malteser International, Aid Médicale Internationale, CARE, and 
German Agro-Action.  They followed the approach pioneered by UNODC as well as helping to 
control malaria, address the small but growing incidence of HIV in the Wa towns, and providing 
support to the educational system (with Chinese and Myanmar curricula).
By this time, though, the war on drugs had caught up with the Wa and the UNODC Wa 
Project.  In January 2005, a Federal Court in New York handed down indictments on eight Wa 
leaders for trading heroin and methamphetamines.  As Lintner and Black note (p. 91), this led to
the temporary removal of the staff (actually only the international staff) from the Wa Region. 
But what they do not mention is that the U.S.  Embassy in Rangoon concluded that death threats 
had been made against the three DEA agents in the country.  This led directly to the United 
States cancelling its funding of the Wa Project (approximately three-quarters of the total at that 
Table 1 One Month and One Year of UNODC Work in the Wa Region
Activity September 2007 January–December 2007
Irrigation Canals 45 km 200 km
Rice Fields Developed 60 ha 260 ha
Feeder Roads 30 km 500 km
Fish Ponds 90 606
Villagers Trained 350 1,850
Source: UNODC Wa Project records (compiled by the author who was the Project Manager at the time).
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time).2)  Although funding from Australia was received to extend the life of the project for another 
year (until 2007), the project was obliged to cease operations before all the people who could
benefit from UNODC inputs could be reached.  Nonetheless, many other agencies had their own
funding and alternative development went on although drug treatment was reduced.
None of this later information is in Merchants of Madness.  Lintner and Black disparage UN 
leaders as misinformed (pp. 101–102), make a very brief reference to the UN as envisioning the
problem as “agricultural” (p. 111), and refer to the “December 2005 Myanmar Country Profile.” 
However, there are no references in the “Notes on Sources” to any interviews of any UN official 
(UNODC or otherwise) or to any UNDCP or UNODC project reports or documents and nothing 
on UNODC after 2005.
This is significant because the activities carried out in the Wa Region provide an alternative 
approach to dealing with Myanmar than what Lintner and Black propose.  They suggest that, 
 quoting an address by Aung San Suu Kyi in 1989, a “lasting solution to the problems of the ethnic 
minorities [including drug production] . . . [is] to secure the highest degree of autonomy [for those 
minorities] ”(p. 146).
While one cannot dispute this, it is also indisputable that minority groups have faced serious 
problems since the 1960s.  Many international agencies, including INGOs, believe that no action 
can be taken for the overall good before any resolution to the problems are forthcoming.  But if 
they were asked, the Wa villagers who are growing more rice, have water supplies in the village, 
and who have stopped using opium would agree that the interventions were useful regardless of 
continued ATS production.
Though not mentioned by the authors UNODC’s work in the Wa Region achieved the follow-
ing results: 1) Preventing a humanitarian crisis after the ban; 2) Providing support for the peace 
process; and 3) Setting an example for working in other ceasefire areas.  This has been the longest 
and biggest such internationally-supported project in Myanmar since independence in 1948.  No 
other such project has involved so many partners and so many beneficiaries.  Nor has there ever 
been any project of this scale and scope in a ceasefire area.  The approach pioneered here can be 
productively utilized in other such areas in Myanmar.  Technically the book is sound in terms of 
formatting and proofreading except for the index which has some errors.  Despite their misunder-
standing of UNODC’s work in the Wa Region, the authors make a useful contribution by describing
the seriousness of the ATS problem in Thailand and in neighboring areas.
Ronald D. Renard
Chiang Mai University
2) See “Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Illicit
Drug Producing Countries for FY 2008,” affirming this action (which was not communicated to
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Cashing in across the Golden Triangle: Thailand’s Northern Border Trade 
with China, Laos, and Myanmar
THEIN SWE and PAUL CHAMBERS
Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, 2011, xx+192p.
This book is an interim report on the Thailand-China border trade and particularly on two roads 
constructed under the Greater Mekong Subregion project.
The first of these roads, R3B, was completed in 2004.  It runs from the Thai border at Mae 
Sai through the Shan States of Burma to the China border at Mongla.  It’s not doing very well. 
Traffic is occasionally disrupted by ethnic insurgents.  The Burmese government repeatedly closes
the border crossing to display political pique.  The road surface is already falling part.  The daily 
value of goods passing the Mae Sai checkpoint is only half the daily take of one of the three casinos 
on the Tachilek side.
The second road, R3A, running from the Thai border at Chiang Khong across Laos to the 
China border at Boten, was completed in 2008.  Its utility will increase when a new bridge is built 
across the Mekong at Chiang Khong, now scheduled to open in June 2013.  Even then, Chiang 
Khong is remote from Thailand’s main road or rail network so the ultimate value of the route is 
still uncertain.
At present more traffic is still carried on the river route down the Mekong to Chiang Saen 
which is slower but cheaper and viewed (at least until recent shooting incidents) as safer and more
reliable.  On all three routes, most of the traffic is typical border trade, food and consumer goods. 
There is a little resource extraction to China, mostly rubber and refined oil, which now passes 
